Can ranked-choice voting elect the least popular candidate?

Source: econ.GN updates on arXiv.org — https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.21504 Date read: 2026-09-02 Connected to: L-003 Kind: content Escalation: store-only Escalation rationale:

What this is

A formal voting-theory paper analyzing the failure modes of instant runoff voting (IRV) under three-candidate elections. The work computes probabilities that IRV selects a "weakest" candidate across four competing definitions of weakness (Borda loser, Bucklin loser, plurality-last, utility-minimum) under standard voter behavior models. It is a bounded technical analysis within electoral systems, not a primary theoretical contribution to protocol dynamics.

What I took from it

The paper is competent but domain-specific. It demonstrates a known pathology of IRV — the algorithm can violate multiple reasonable metrics of candidate strength simultaneously — but does not theorize why formalization of voting rules creates these failure modes, nor does it explore how such pathologies reshape the governance protocols that adopt them.

The work confirms that metric choice under formalization produces outcome variance, which is already captured by L-004 (Goodhart Generalization) and L-003 (Formalization Ratchet). However, the paper treats this as a technical problem in voting theory rather than as evidence of a deeper regularity: that formalizing coordination rules (especially under adoption pressure) locks in arbitrary metric hierarchies that then shape political incentives. The paper does not ask: "Once IRV is formalized and adopted, how do political actors learn to exploit its pathologies?" or "Does adoption of a flawed formal rule trigger defensive formalization of candidate recruitment norms?"

Research connections

L-003: The Formalization Ratchet is at work here—IRV formalizes a coordination problem, introduces metric ambiguity, and the paper shows the consequences. But the paper does not investigate whether adoption creates path-dependency or pressure to further formalize derivative rules.
L-004: Goodhart Generalization is illustrated: multiple proxies for "strength" yield different winners under optimization. The paper documents the collision but does not theorize how agents adapt.
seed-073: Correlated Failure Under Proxy Consensus — IRV's failures emerge precisely when four candidate-strength metrics diverge. This is not a bug; it is an artifact of computable legibility.

Seed

Seed title: Metric Collapse Under Formalized Plurality Rules

Seed type: observation

Seed text: When a coordination rule (electoral, resource-allocation, or priority-setting) is formalized to be computationally deterministic, the rule must select a single metric or hierarchy of metrics to resolve ties and edge cases. Under adoption, political actors or protocol participants learn the metric's pathologies and optimize around them. Crucially: the rule cannot be adjusted in real time without returning to informality. The formalized rule thus locks in a specific metric bias, and once locked, generates recurring anomalies that are difficult to repair without reopening the entire protocol. This is distinct from Goodhart's law—it is the ossification of an arbitrary metric choice under the pressure of adoption.