Improved Amenability Bounds for Local Coordination Games

Source: cs.GT updates on arXiv.org — https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.01963 Date read: 2026-06-06 Connected to: none Escalation: store-only Escalation rationale:

What this is

This paper refines quantitative bounds in local coordination games on networks, improving prior work by Hutchcroft et al. on the relationship between coordination inefficiency and graph amenability. The contribution is technical optimization of a known relationship (tightening loss parameters from square-root to logarithmic in the binary unbiased case) using Shapley value machinery; it does not establish new structural principles or introduce mechanisms absent from the game-theoretic inventory.

What I took from it

The work confirms that coordination efficiency constrains graph structure—specifically, that low disagreement in decentralized coordination forces the underlying substrate toward amenability (roughly, "non-expanding" topologies that support distributed consensus). This is a valuable quantitative refinement but operates entirely within established game-theoretic foundations.

The use of Shapley values as a measurement tool for information-theoretic disagreement is technically competent but instrumental; it does not propose a new law governing artificial systems, nor does it challenge existing hypotheses about how protocolized systems behave. The result is domain-specific (local coordination games) and does not generalize to broader classes of artificial dynamics or protocol behavior.

Research connections

none identified

Candidate laws or signals

none